There is a lot of talk afoot of the need to rebuild the nation’s infrastructure, and a favourite charge of anti-marketeers is that markets cannot provide complete, integrated networks of roads, bridges canals etc. However, while the market may not provide transportation networks as extensive as those built, subsidized, or sponsored by government, the market would be more likely to provide transportation infrastructure where it would bring the most benefit to the most number of people, while maximizing the efficient use of society’s scarce resources. Of course, those wishing their teeny village a multimillion dollar bridge would be fresh out of luck. Furthermore, the public would be denied admittedly impressive but value-destroying white elephants, such as the Channel Tunnel or the Big Dig. However, this is not to say that the government cannot build worthwhile projects (anyone who has flown into Reagan National Airport can tell you it really needs a much longer runway), but the question remains that even if the market fails to produce a worthwhile public project, then will the politicians and the planners get it right?
I was recently reminded of this quandary while working my way through Tim Blanning’s The Pursuit of Glory: The Five Revolutions that Made Modern Europe: 1648-1815, which includes a chapter discussing the nature of roads and road-building in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. Relying on contemporary accounts, Blanning begins a typical historian’s gush about the grand nature of French road-building and the colossal task undertaken by tens of thousands of workers and vast expenditures by the central government. However, unlike most historians, he digs a little deeper and discovers that, for all the highways’ grandeur, few people bothered to use them. Consider the following quote from Arthur Young—an Englishman touring France in the early eighteenth century. Although much (and grudgingly) impressed with the French roads, he observed that they had emptied a mere ten miles out of Paris and while moving south he observed:
“In 36 miles, I have met one cabriolet, half-a-dozen carts, and some old woman with asses. For what all this waste of treasure?”
So why had such massive roadworks failed utterly to encourage commerce? The answer lies with who decided where the roads went. Eager to impress important persons at court, ministers built roads to serve the latter. Accordingly, the Duc de So and So might have a beautifully paved road running to his remote country chateau, while a major commercial hub went un-serviced. In addition to serving the powerful, the royal roads had also been built to convey the king’s post, edicts, and orders to the far corners of the realm. Thus, the French roads tended to shoot out like spokes in a wheel from Paris towards the regional centers of administration. Unfortunately, while this ensured a straight shot from Paris to many locations, getting from anywhere to anywhere else in France by royal road meant going through Paris. The Sun King’s roads may have radiated out from Paris, but they allowed little in the way of lateral movement, which greatly reduced their commercial utility (a fine road is of little value if one cannot get to it). Despite the dearth of traffic, Frenchmen could rightly take pride in their roads, but often reproducing Young’s fair-mindedness, French travelers to England declared her roads just as fine—If not better—than their French counterparts. According to visitors (French and otherwise), the problem with English roads was that they were too crowded with a steady movement of carriages and carts that one Frenchman described as “magical.”
So why were the English roads crowded and the French roads bare? A logical suggestion might be that the English government employed smarter planners or had a better road-building bureaucracy than the French. However, the truth of the matter is that while the French government dedicated huge amounts to road construction, the British government hardly lifted a finger. True, English locals did owe a customary duty to keep the roads in their district in repair, but this custom had long since degenerated into farce with the gatherings of workmen quickly degenerating into a combination of shirking, drinking, and brawls (not necessarily in that order). This all began to change in 1695 when an entrepreneur petitioned the British Parliament to allow him to build a road upon which he might charge a toll, which would be collected at either end and admission granted through the turning of a pike. No doubt encouraged by a share of the promised revenue, Parliament rapidly agreed. Seeking to maximize the volume of his turnpike, the entrepreneur picked a location that would serve the most traffic. Furthermore, in order keep the revenue flowing fast and furious, he made sure that the road remained in top condition and that the maximum amount of traffic moved smoothly. Following the profits of this first trail-blazer, numerous entrepreneurs began petitioning Parliament for the right to serve the public for a nominal fee. While the turnpike acts came slowly at first (only 25 passed in the 1730s), the improved roads apparently made it easier for members of Parliament to get to London to pass more turnpike acts. The number of turnpike acts increased to 37 in the 1740s, before exploding to 170 during the 1750s and an additional 170 the following decade. By 1770 an estimated 15,000 miles of roads had been built in Great Britain, while the traveling time between most places in the British Isles declined by a factor of four.
What was true in the eighteenth century is true today. Markets can and will provide infrastructure provided they are allowed to. Meanwhile, government sponsored infrastructure is more likely to serve the interests of politicians than the people. History is littered with “bridges to nowhere,” and that trend is unlikely to change anytime soon.
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